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Ubuntu and business ethics: Problems, perspectives and prospects 
 
Abstract 
The African philosophy of Ubuntu is typically characterised as a communitarian philosophy 
that emphasises virtues such as compassion, tolerance and harmony. In recent years there has 
been growing interest in this philosophy, and in how it can be applied to a variety of 
disciplines and issues. Several authors have provided useful introductions of Ubuntu in the 
field of business ethics and suggested theoretical ways in which it could be applied. The 
purpose of this paper is to extend this discussion by providing a more critical analysis of 
Ubuntu and business ethics with the aim of clarifying the role that Ubuntu can play, and 
providing guidance for further research in this area. The analysis consists of three sections. In 
the first, certain problems are identified within the existing literature. This is followed by a 
consideration of alternative perspectives and interpretations of Ubuntu. The last section, 
following from the first two, identifies specific areas requiring further research, both 
empirical and non-empirical, as well as ways in which Ubuntu could be fruitfully applied.  
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Ubuntu and business ethics: Problems, perspectives and prospects 
In recent years there has been growing interest in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, and how 
it can be applied to various issues. An increasingly sophisticated philosophical literature has 
developed around the concept of Ubuntu, and a number of scholars have proposed 
applications in the sphere of business ethics. As a communitarian philosophy that stresses the 
importance of inter-personal relationships and values such as harmony and care, it clearly has 
relevance for the business sphere. Previous research in this area has contributed by providing 
an introduction to the concept and several interpretations of how Ubuntu could apply to 
business and business ethics. However, this requires ongoing analysis and reflection.  The 
purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of Ubuntu and business ethics with the 
intention of more clearly identifying the role that Ubuntu can play in the sphere of business 
ethics and providing guidance for further research in this area.  
This purpose is achieved in three ways. Firstly, by reviewing the literature on Ubuntu and 
business ethics and considering some of the arguments therein. Specific problems are 
identified concerning empirical claims that have been made, and ambiguities regarding the 
distinctiveness of Ubuntu itself. Secondly, through a discussion of other research relevant to 
Ubuntu (although not specifically dealing with business ethics), including a number of cross-
cultural empirical studies and alternative philosophical perspectives. Lastly, following the 
preceding analysis, by considering the prospects for future research and providing 
suggestions for more fruitful applications of Ubuntu in the area of business ethics. This 
includes the identification of specific research questions and areas that require further 
research (both empirical and non-empirical), as well as a consideration of Ubuntu’s role in 
reconciliation and nation-building, and Metz’s Ubuntu ethics of harmony as an example of a 
more analytical approach to the subject.  
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The paper is structured so as to address each of these three areas in turn. However, before the 
literature on Ubuntu and business ethics can be considered, some consideration of the 
epistemological assumptions that underlie this paper and a brief overview of what is meant by 
Ubuntu is necessary. 
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions underlie the analysis presented in this paper. Firstly, truth claims 
require justification with reasons that are acceptable, adequate and relevant (Hughes et al., 
2010). In the absence of such reasons, claims are not justified. Unjustified claims are not, 
however, necessarily false. Secondly, empirical claims require empirical justification. 
Thirdly, within an academic context, for empirical evidence to meet the criteria of 
acceptability and adequacy some methods of ensuring the validity and reliability of findings 
must have been adopted (Saunders et al., 2000). Relevant empirical evidence that is obtained 
and analysed using such methods should be considered, but the acceptability and adequacy of 
such evidence is subject to the limitations of the research procedures involved.  
As there are no ways of assessing or ensuring the validity and reliability of anecdotal 
evidence and personal experience, these are not considered to provide acceptable or adequate 
support for empirical generalisations made in an academic context. This is not to say that 
anecdotes and personal experience do not have an important epistemological role in our 
personal views, day-to-day lives, and in generating research questions and ideas. This also 
does not require that one is committed to a view of knowledge being completely objective 
and/or impersonal; personal judgements remain necessary in interpreting and evaluating 
claims and evidence. 
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Like all epistemological assumptions, these can be subjected to criticism. It is not the purpose 
of this paper to argue that this position is necessarily true or self-evident, and those who 
disagree with this stance may not agree with the analysis presented. Nevertheless this stance 
is adopted as it underlies a great deal of work in business ethics (as well as philosophy and 
science more generally) and is compatible with positivist and phenomenological / 
interpretive, quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
 
WHAT IS UBUNTU?1 
Scholars of Ubuntu often note how the concept cannot easily be translated, or adequately 
conveyed, in English. Nevertheless, the concept is variously translated as “African 
humanness” (Broodryk, 2002, p. 13), “humanity” (Shutte, 2001, p. 2), “humanism or 
humaneness” (Mnyaka and Motlhabi, 2009, p. 63), or “the process of becoming an ethical 
human being” (Mkhize, 2008, p. 35). Most scholars explain Ubuntu as a communitarian ethic 
by referring to an African aphorism: ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (or slight variations 
thereof), which itself can be translated in various ways, such as “I am, because we are; and 
since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1989, p. 106)2, or “persons depends on persons to be 
persons” (Shutte, 2001, p. 8).   
Ubuntu can also be explained in terms of its etymology. Ramose (1999, p. 50) argues that 
Ubuntu is best understood as a combination of ‘ubu-’ meaning ‘being’ or ‘be-ing becoming’, 
and ‘-ntu’ representing ‘being’ taking concrete form, or “temporarily having become” (1999, 
p. 51)3. Mkhize (2008, p. 41) maintains a similar interpretation, but notes that ‘-ntu’ refers 
specifically to human beings. As a Nguni word, Ubuntu is South African, but a number of 
scholars (such as Mnyaka and Motlhabi (2009, p. 63) and Ramose (2003a, p. 326)) point out 
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that there are equivalent words in Tswana and Shona, thereby including Botswana and 
Zimbabwe (see also Samkange and Samkange (1980)). Kamwangamalu (1999, p. 25) 
observes that the concept may extend to Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Angola, and Ramose (1999) suggests it may reflect sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole. Mkhize (2008, p. 36) even draws attention to parallels between Ubuntu 
and the ancient Egyptian concept of Maat. 
All explanations of Ubuntu emphasise its nature as a communitarian ethic, and it is often 
contrasted with Western individualism. Ramose (2003c, p. 231) identifies ontological and 
epistemological aspects of Ubuntu, and his explanation of the aphorism ‘umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu’ captures both its ontological and ethical dimensions:  
to be a human be-ing is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of 
others and, on that basis, establish humane relations with them. Ubuntu, understood 
as be-ing human (humanness); a human, respectful and polite attitude towards others 
constitutes the core meaning of this aphorism. 
The ethical content of Ubuntu is frequently articulated by providing a list of values or virtues 
which are consistent with, and required by, Ubuntu. Mkhize (2008, p. 43) notes that Ubuntu 
“incorporates ideas of social justice, righteousness, care, empathy for others and respect”. 
Mnyaka and Motlhabi (2009, p. 74) write that Ubuntu “is inclusive … it is best realised in 
deeds of kindness, compassion, caring, sharing, solidarity and sacrifice.” Nussbaum (2009b, 
p. 100) claims that Ubuntu “is the capacity in African culture to express compassion, 
reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building and maintaining 
community”. Broodryk (2002, p. 32) identifies the core values of Ubuntu as humanness, 
caring, sharing, respect and compassion, and for each these provides several additional 
‘associated’ values4. 
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Despite the broad agreement (at least in general terms), significant ambiguities remain. Some 
scholars (such as Mkhize (2008) and Mafunisa (2008)) consider Ubuntu to be religious, 
where one’s ancestors are as much a part of the community as living humans. Others (such as 
Metz (2007)) prefer a purely secular interpretation. Whether Ubuntu is distinctively African 
or universal is also unclear, as some scholars (such as Nussbaum (2009b)) draw attention to 
exemplars of Ubuntu in Western countries, while others (Metz, 2007; Mnyaka and Motlhabi, 
2009) argue that it is particular to (or particularly prominent amongst) black African peoples 
(Broodryk (2002, p. 27) is unusual in including Afrikaans and Cape Afrikaans words 
alongside Bantu words meaning Ubuntu). As indicated above, there is also a proliferation of 
values or virtues that can be associated with Ubuntu, with the possible consequence that 
Ubuntu comes to mean no more than what is good or virtuous.  
In recent years attempts have been made to apply Ubuntu to a range of issues and disciplines, 
including the law (Bennett, 2011; Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti, 2011), education (Mungwini, 
2011; Muwanga-Zake, 2009), health (Mji et al., 2011; Outwater et al., 2005) and psychology 
(Berg et al., 2011; Hanks, 2008). Similarly, there have been several papers in the academic 
business ethics literature (Lutz, 2009; Ntibagirirwa, 2009; Prinsloo, 2000), book chapters that 
deal explicitly with Ubuntu and business (Ndiweni, 2008; Nussbaum, 2009a; Shutte, 2001), 
and publications in both the popular and academic management literature (Karsten and Illa, 
2005; Khomba and Vermaak, 2012a, 2012b; Khomba et al., 2012; Lundin and Nelson, 2010; 
Mangaliso, 2001; Mbigi and Maree, 2005).   
 
UBUNTU AND BUSINESS ETHICS: THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
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Two arguments can be identified that pervade much of the existing literature on Ubuntu and 
business ethics. The first argument claims that economic systems should reflect the value 
systems of their societies, that sub-Saharan African societies maintain the values of Ubuntu 
(values that are different to those in the West), and therefore that economic systems in sub-
Saharan Africa should reflect the values of Ubuntu. This argument is expressed by 
Ntibagirirwa (2009) and to some extent by Ndiweni (2008) and Lutz (2009) (see also Murove 
(2008, 2009)), although Ndiweni focuses on corporate governance and Lutz on business 
education, rather than economic systems. Implicit in this argument is that systems based on 
Ubuntu would be significantly different from other (usually Western) economic systems.  
The second argument claims that Ubuntu, as a distinctive ethic, can contribute significantly to 
the development of business ethics globally. This is expressed, to varying extents, by Lutz 
(2009), Prinsloo (2000), Shutte (2001) and Nussbaum (2009a).  
There are, however, several problems with both of the arguments as they have been 
presented. These require some attention as they significantly impact on the success of these 
arguments, and ultimately on the role that Ubuntu can play within business ethics.  
 
Empirical claims  
The first argument described above includes the premise that sub-Saharan African societies 
maintain the values of Ubuntu, values that are different to those maintained by Western 
societies. This is an empirical claim that requires empirical justification. However, there is 
very little, if any, empirical support provided in the literature to support this claim. Instead, it 
is simply assumed, or categorically stated, that Africans do in fact maintain the values of 
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Ubuntu and that their values differ from those in the West. Ntibagirirwa (2009, p. 304), for 
example, states that  
most Africans still retain most of their values: they still converse in their own 
languages, still have their African style homes, African food, and Africans’ world 
views, and value systems remain noticeably different from those of the West. 
Ntibagagirwa cites Matthews in support, yet Matthews (2004, p. 379) herself merely states 
that African values and world-views differ from those in the West, she does not provide any 
supporting evidence. Similarly, Lutz (2009, p. 315) claims that “it is true generally that 
Africans are less individualistic, more communal than Westerners”, but does not provide any 
empirical support5. 
In some cases anecdotal evidence is provided to support this premise. Ndiweni (2008), for 
example, argues for a corporate governance framework to be informed by Ubuntu and 
identified a number of Corporate Social Responsibility practices by certain businesses in 
Zimbabwe as examples of Ubuntu in practice. These include the provision of educational 
assistance, scholarships, apprenticeships, subsidised accommodation and financial assistance. 
It is questionable, however, whether these do in fact reflect an African value system that 
differs from values maintained in the West, as many of these activities are replicated by 
companies in Western countries6. As noted earlier, although anecdotal evidence may 
influence one’s personal views and may generate valuable ideas that can become the subject 
of research projects, in an academic context such evidence is insufficient to support the 
generalisation that sub-Saharan African societies maintain the values of Ubuntu, values that 
are different to those maintained in the West. 
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Appeal may also be made to the personal experience of Ubuntu scholars and of prominent 
Africans that support Ubuntu. Personal experiences can be a valuable source of information 
where they can provide practical examples of a particular phenomenon (and can also generate 
valuable research questions). However, within an academic context, such experiences are not 
sufficient to justify general claims concerning the value systems of societies. This is even 
more problematic when the claims concern differences between societies, as this requires 
generalisation of more than one society’s values, as well as when there are multiple, varying 
personal experiences that support different conclusions. 
The inadequacy of anecdotes and personal experience in supporting general empirical claims 
in an academic context is not limited to those supporting the premise discussed above. Those 
who argue, on the basis of anecdote and personal experience, that Africans do not maintain 
the values of Ubuntu are subject to the same criticism. Ultimately, a critical approach to 
general empirical claims requires that, in an academic context, we discount evidence based 
on anecdote and personal experience as inacceptable and inadequate, and favour evidence 
obtained through more systematic methods that include steps to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the findings. 
Regarding the first argument presented above, the claim that sub-Saharan Africans maintain 
the values of Ubuntu, values that are different to those maintained in the West, has therefore 
not been adequately justified in the existing literature. This has an important implication, as 
the conclusion of the argument (that economic systems in sub-Saharan Africa should reflect 
the values of Ubuntu) relies on the truth of this premise. Note, however, that this does not 
mean that either the premise or the conclusion is false (only that their truth has not yet been 
demonstrated). 
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The distinctiveness of Ubuntu 
Many explanations of Ubuntu contrast it with the values of Western society, commonly 
expressed as an individualistic ethic. However, the presentation of Western values and/or 
business theories in the literature is at times questionable. For example, Ntibagirirwa 
describes Western social life wherein “the individual could now act unconstrained by the 
society and the hierarchical authority” (2009, p. 302) and regarding economic development, 
contrasts an African ethic with “the neo-liberal belief that self-interest and rational choice 
require that the market run the economic show alone, thus excluding the state and the people” 
(2009, p. 307).  
On a practical level, commercial law and regulation provide examples of how Western 
society and authority place specific constraints on individual actions. Furthermore, even some 
of the more ardent supporters of a shareholder-oriented approach to capitalism, such as 
Milton Friedman (1970), mention constraints to individual actions. Friedman described 
executives’ responsibilities as 
[conducting] the business in accordance with their [shareholders’] desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. 
(1970, p. 33) 
Even if what exactly ‘ethical custom’ comprises is subject to ongoing reflection and debate, 
Friedman did not consider executives to be unconstrained. Other theorists have more recently 
argued for shareholder wealth maximisation and/or the prioritisation of shareholder interests, 
subject to certain ethical and legal constraints. These include Sternberg (1997, 2000), 
Sundarum & Inkpen (2004a, 2004b), and Coelho et al. (2003a, 2003b)7. These theorists 
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provide an ethical context for the shareholder oriented versions of Western capitalism and yet 
they are typically not considered when Ubuntu is contrasted with Western capitalism. (Lutz 
(2009, p. 313), for example, specifically rejects shareholder wealth maximisation theories 
that advocate acting unethically in the maximisation of shareholder wealth, but does not 
address shareholder-oriented theories that incorporate ethical and legal constraints.)  This is 
not to say, however, that these shareholder-oriented theorists have necessarily succeeded in 
their arguments, or that such theories are above criticism on ethical grounds, only that they 
deserve attention in any evaluation of the ethics of Western capitalism. 
Ntibagirirwa’s claim that the state and the people are excluded from the economic sphere is 
also undermined by the continued debate that has taken place in Western nations over the last 
century regarding the optimum level of regulation of private enterprise, and by the popular 
political catchphrase heard in Western democracies at election time: ‘it’s the economy, 
stupid!’.  Both the state and the general population have important roles to play in achieving 
economic development in Western nations, the role of the market is primarily one of 
allocating resources effectively and efficiently. 
These characterisations of Western values and business theories can serve to create a ‘space’ 
for Ubuntu as a value system that is different, and that stands in stark opposition to the 
dominant values underlying Western business and economics. Yet, Ubuntu scholars also 
acknowledge the similarities that Ubuntu has with other value systems. Prinsloo (2000, p. 
277) acknowledges similarities with Christianity, Communism, Liberalism, Socialism, 
Democracy and Capitalism, claims that “Ubuntu vocabulary is not unfamiliar to Western 
thinking” (2000, p. 283), and even that “Ubuntu is not altogether new or even not at all new, 
different or unique” (2000, p. 284). Lutz (2009) identifies similarities with Confucianism and 
Plato-Aristotelian ethics, and also acknowledges that “although some features of Ubuntu are 
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distinctively African, its essential features are not, because it is rooted in human nature, 
which is common to the entire human race” (2009, p. 319).  
Shutte (2001) provides a different approach. He develops an Ubuntu ethic which combines 
elements of both Western and African ethics, where the former contributes the concept of 
‘freedom’ and the latter that of ‘community’. Together these reflect the personal growth that 
occurs in relation to others, demonstrated in mother/child, master/student and friend/friend 
relationships. In applying this to the world of work, Shutte argues that work needs to be 
humanised, and that work must serve humanity, not vice versa. In support, Shutte draws on 
the writings of Karl Marx, Pope John Paul II, Simone Weil and E.F. Schumacher amongst 
others, but does not include any African references at all. Nussbaum’s (2009a) reflections are 
similar in that she argues for a humanistic approach to business, but also draws largely on 
Westerners such as business advisor Verna Allee and uses Western companies as examples. 
As such, her discussion does not seem to differ significantly from contemporary discussion 
around ‘sustainable business’. The work of both Shutte and Nussbaum questions whether the 
values of Ubuntu are distinctively African. 
The degree to which Ubuntu provides a distinctive ethic that can contribute to global business 
ethics thus remains unclear. Lutz (2009) argues that Ubuntu entails a vision of corporations 
as communities that differs from Western interpretations, stating that “the purpose of 
management is … [not] to benefit many collections of individuals, as stakeholder theories tell 
us, but to benefit the community, as well as the larger communities of which it is part” (2009, 
p. 318), adding that “to promote the good of a community is to promote the good of all its 
members” (2009, p. 318). However, it is not yet clear how, conceiving of the corporation as a 
community, it is to be promoted in ways that differ from contemporary Western practices 
(including stakeholder management). In this regard it is worth considering the practices of 
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highly successful Western businesses that do not prioritise shareholder wealth maximisation 
over all else (see, for example, Collins and Porras (1994) and Waterman (1994)). Coelho et 
al.’s (2003a, p. 17) argument that shareholder capitalism serves the public interest is also 
relevant. They argue, using an example of mousetrap production, that competition and open 
markets results in benefits for consumers, suppliers, and the general public (through 
improved mice control and public health).  
Prinsloo (2000) provides a more practical application of Ubuntu, discussing Mbigi’s case 
study of the Eastern Highlands Tea Estates that shows how in the African context, bottom-up 
participative management practices can prove successful. Apart from the inclusion of some 
African customs, he does not, however, indicate how the case study illustrates values that are 
not (or that are less) prevalent in Western contexts. Indeed, the participative management 
style he describes in the case study is familiar to many Western management courses. 
Nussbaum’s (2009a) reflections on Ubuntu are again similar – she describes a successful 
program of employee participation at a South African company, and draws similarities with a 
program in an American company. 
The acknowledgement that Ubuntu values are universal, and the absence of distinctively 
African business practices that correspond to the values of Ubuntu questions the degree to 
which Ubuntu presents a distinctive ethic that can inform business ethics globally. Greater 
clarity regarding what is meant by Ubuntu and the degree to which Ubuntu values are 
universal or particular to Africa is required. 
 
OTHER PERSPECTIVES AND RESEARCH ON UBUNTU 
Ubuntu and business ethics 
14 
 
There are a number of other perspectives and empirical studies that also have an impact on 
our understanding of the concept of Ubuntu, and the role that it can play in business ethics. 
These remain unacknowledged, or under-acknowledged in the existing literature on Ubuntu 
and business ethics, or make more recent contributions that require consideration in future. 
 
Existing cross-cultural studies 
Although the existing research on Ubuntu and business ethics does not provide adequate 
empirical evidence to support the claim that sub-Saharan Africans maintain the values of 
Ubuntu, several cross-cultural studies within the management literature have included 
African respondents in their research, and could provide some evidence regarding the values 
of sub-Saharan Africans. Although preferable to anecdote and personal experience, there are 
significant methodological limitations to these studies that confound attempts to generalise 
the findings to national groups or to sub-Saharan African society in general. Firstly, the 
results of non-random and non-representative samples cannot be easily generalised using 
either statistical or non-statistical approaches. Secondly, it is highly questionable whether 
complex cultural values such as individualism and collectivism can be adequately studied by 
means of quantitative surveys. The results of these studies must accordingly be considered in 
the light of these limitations. 
The most well-known of cross-cultural studies in management is that of Hofstede (1983, 
2001), who studied differences across national cultures amongst IBM employees in 53 
countries. He adopted several cultural dimensions, including one addressing Individualism 
and Collectivism, explained as follows (1984, p. 83): 
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Individualism stands for a preference for a loosely knit social framework wherein 
individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only 
… The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among individuals. It relates to people’s self-
concept: ‘I’ or ‘we’. 
This dimension is of particular relevance to Ubuntu, given the communitarian nature of 
Ubuntu philosophy. A society that maintains the values of Ubuntu would be expected to 
favour the Collective aspect of this dimension, reflected in a low score. Indeed, out of 100 
(and with an overall mean of 43, across 53 countries), the regions of East and West Africa did 
reflect low scores of 27 and 20 respectively, in contrast to high scores for the USA (91), 
Australia (90) and Great Britain (89) (Hofstede, 2001, p. 215). South Africa was the only 
individual African country included in Hofstede’s study and had a score of 65 on this 
dimension. However, as the study was conducted in the height of apartheid, when black 
South Africans were prohibited from entering the skilled labour force, this study cannot be 
considered to have any relevance for South African society. With regard to the findings for 
East and West Africa, Hofstede’s study does provide some support for the claim that sub-
Saharan Africans maintain a communitarian value system, unlike that in the West. 
Thomas and Bendixen (2000) replicated Hofstede’s study amongst 586 middle-managers in 
post-apartheid South Africa, and made comparisons across different ethnic groups within 
South Africa. As a total group the South African managers in Thomas and Bendixen’s study 
recorded a score of 81 on the Individualism-Collectivism dimension, suggesting a relatively 
individualist orientation. When the results were split by ethnicity, the black South African 
respondents (Sotho: 79, Xhosa: 78, Zulu: 83) had scores similar to the White (Afrikaans: 77, 
English: 88), Asian (71) and Coloured (of mixed race: 84) respondents.  
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These results suggest no difference between black South Africans and white Afrikaans South 
Africans, and no great difference between black South Africans and white English South 
Africans. Thomas and Bendixen (2000, p. 514), however, argued that there may be 
differences between a Western and an African understanding of the word ‘family’, which was 
used in the survey, and which could have led to an overstated score for Individualism. They 
concluded that Hofstede’s instrument is “inadequate in distinguishing between individualism 
and communalism in a management context within South Africa” (2000, p. 516) and 
recommend further research. However, the low scores on this scale for both East Africa and 
West Africa in Hofstede’s original study confirm the belief that these societies are (or were) 
relatively collectivist. Thomas and Bendixen’s interpretation of the South African results, 
achieved using the same scale, thus raises a further question: If the scale is unable to 
satisfactorily distinguish between individualism and collectivism within South Africa, are we 
still justified in accepting Hofstede’s earlier findings regarding East and West Africa? (Or, 
conversely, if we accept Hofstede’s earlier findings regarding East and West Africa, to be 
consistent should we not also accept the results of Thomas and Bendixen’s survey of South 
Africans, conducted using the same instrument?) 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) also presented empirical research regarding 
cultural values within South Africa, based on survey information from company managers 
and administrators. They drew largely on Parson’s (1951) relational orientations, and worked 
with six cultural orientations, including one on Individualism-Communitarianism. This 
referred to whether people “regard themselves primarily as individuals or primarily as part of 
a group” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997, p. 8), with high scores reflecting a 
preference for individualism, and low scores communitarianism. White South African 
respondents scored 58 (Afrikaans) and 72 (English), and black South African respondents 
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scores ranged from 22 to 73 (Tsonga: 22, South Sotho: 42, Zulu: 51, Tswana: 52, North 
Sotho: 68, and Xhosa: 73). Although the range is greater than Thomas and Bendixen’s 
results, these results suggest that some black South African groups (Xhosa and North Sotho) 
are more individualistic than white Afrikaans South Africans, and that there is no real 
difference between Xhosa and English South Africans.   
A final example of relevant cross-cultural research is Noorderhaven and Tidjani’s (2001) 
study. This is notable for its use of a research instrument with an explicitly African bias to 
counteract Western bias that may be present in other studies. The survey was administered in 
14 countries, including six countries from sub-Saharan Africa (for South Africa, only the 
white South African sample was large enough for inclusion in the results). A number of the 
scales are relevant to the concept of Ubuntu, the results on these scales for the African 
countries, the UK and the USA are presented in table 1.  
[TABLE 1] 
Excluding the (white) South African results from the group of African countries (shown in 
the table for completeness), review of these findings indicates that the UK and USA have 
significantly higher scores than most of the African countries on ‘Societal responsibility’, 
significantly higher scores than all of the African countries on ‘Human goodness’, and very 
similar scores to all of the African countries on ‘Traditional Wisdom’. Regarding the 
‘Collectivism’ and ‘Sharing’ scales, the UK and USA have similar scores to some African 
countries and display differences with others (note that Noorderhaven and Tidjani 
acknowledge difficulties in interpreting the ‘Collectivism’ dimension). Touching on several 
different aspects of Ubuntu, these results suggest greater complexity both within sub-Saharan 
Africa and between sub-Saharan Africa and Western countries than typically acknowledged.  
Ubuntu and business ethics 
18 
 
In addition to the research discussed above that deals with cultural dimensions or 
orientations, Bernstein (2002) describes a nationwide survey which deserves some mention as 
it addressed Ubuntu more directly: 
Respondents were asked ‘What do African people in southern Africa have in common 
with one another which might help them catch up in development?’. The number of 
people who mentioned ubuntu ... traditionalism, or ancestor worship was no more 
than 2-3 percent in replies that could be associated with something essentially 
‘African’ (2002, p. 201). 
Another question asked was, ‘What is the special African way in which [then] Deputy 
President Mbeki’s notion of an African renaissance will be achieved, or is there no 
special African way?’ ... 7 percent referred to a return to traditional beliefs and 3 
percent to ubuntu (2002, p. 202). 
Although this survey suggests that Ubuntu is not widely held, it is subject to similar problems 
of generalisation as those discussed above, and is open to multiple interpretations. 
The mixed results and methodological limitations of all of these studies preclude any simple 
generalisations regarding the values of sub-Saharan Africans being justified. It is premature 
to conclude, on the basis of the existing evidence, that sub-Saharan Africans are either 
individualistic or collectivist, or that they do or do not maintain the values of Ubuntu. At 
present, we can only conclude that such generalisations are unjustified. Nevertheless, the 
results of these studies are useful in suggesting a more nuanced understanding of value 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa and in raising additional questions for further research. These 
are considered in more detail in the ‘prospects’ section below. 
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Ubuntu as a traditional, pre-colonial morality 
Supporters of Ubuntu typically emphasise its traditional African origins. Referring to the 
contemporary philosophy of Ubuntu as a traditional African morality implies that it 
represents the wisdom of pre-colonial African society, a wisdom that remains present among 
the less modernised of black South African society (predominantly in the rural areas), and 
possibly also in the collective memory of their more modernised counterparts. Undesirable 
aspects of traditional African morality can be identified, however, and include ethnocentric 
practices (and nepotism) and gender inequality. Given that such practices are widely 
condemned in contemporary South Africa, this raises the question of which practices and 
values are (or should be) included in Ubuntu: If some traditional values or practices are 
excluded from Ubuntu, what are the criteria by which values and practices are deemed 
acceptable as Ubuntu values and practices? Furthermore, the emphasis placed upon Ubuntu’s 
traditional origins suggests that discontinuity with pre-colonial tradition may question the 
legitimacy and authenticity of Ubuntu itself.  
Bernstein (2002, p. 198) argues that colonialism, apartheid, and particularly migrant labour, 
did much to disrupt continuity between rural (traditional) and urban black South Africans. 
Referring to the continuation of some practices, such as the payment of lobola8, she claims 
that “it is dangerously misleading, however, to suggest that some cultural elements represent 
the tip of a powerful if partly submerged cultural substructure, just because their lineage 
connects back to precolonial societies” (2002, p. 198). Bernstein goes on to argue that 
The rediscovery of African values and culture is largely an elite reinterpretation of 
residues of what used to be. Ubuntu is the prime example, and the major feature of its 
current definition is boundless idealism and the failure to reconcile it with the 
everyday reality of crime, violence and brutality of life in urban concentrations. One 
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gets the uneasy feeling that the fashionable celebration of Ubuntu is intended more 
for white consumption or to display a badge of (Africanist?) honor than as sincere 
moral reconstruction. (2002, p. 210) 
Van Binsbergen (2001, p. 74) offers a similar critique, claiming that, 
Ubuntu offers the appearance of an ancestral model to [those who fought to attain 
majority rule] that is credible and with which they can identify, regardless of whether 
these urban, globalised people still observe ancestral codes of conduct – of course in 
most respects they do not, regardless of whether the ancestral codes are rendered 
correctly (often they are not). 
He argues that the systematisation of Ubuntu is an etic practice, and that the  
self-proclaimed experts on Ubuntu form a globally-informed, Southern African 
intellectual elite who, remote in place and social practice from the emic expressions 
at the village level which they seek to capture, have officially coined the concept of 
Ubuntu as a cornerstone Southern African self-reflexive ethnography. (2001, p. 70) 
Van Binsbergen is not necessarily hostile to Ubuntu, but maintains an interpretation of 
Ubuntu as a utopian and prophetic philosophy (2001, p. 73), as an “exhortative instrument” 
(2001, p. 73) and as a “tool for transformation in a context of globalisation” (2001, p. 71). 
Eze (2010) also argues for a revitalised or reinterpreted Ubuntu as a moral ideal for a new 
age. He concedes the charges made by Van Binsbergen and others regarding the historical 
inauthenticity of Ubuntu, but refuses to accept its illegitimacy and seeks to ‘rehabilitate’ 
Ubuntu as a valuable myth that has a performative task in post-apartheid nation-building in 
South Africa: 
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As a postcolonial discourse, Ubuntu possess[es] the following credentials: (1) a 
reverse discourse to thwart and undermine the preceding racial hegemony of 
apartheid discourse that denied ‘humanity’ to nonwhites through its institutional and 
structural racism; (2) a project in the making of a new nation, which, unlike 
apartheid, yields to inclusiveness as opposed to divisiveness; (3) its admissibility and 
evidence in the TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] mediate[s] its values as 
a humanistic discourse; and (4) while it has been criticized for legitimizing 
restorative [as opposed to retributive] justice, it offers a blueprint for the very process 
of reconciliation and possibility of social morality. (Eze, 2010, p. 186) 
The work of Bernstein, Van Binbergen and Eze is introduced here due to its omission in the 
existing literature on Ubuntu and business ethics (excepting Eze, published more recently in 
2010) and the alternative perspectives that they provide. No argument is being made that 
these perspectives on Ubuntu are accurate; they can be subjected to criticisms regarding the 
use of anecdotal evidence and personal experience, and in places appear to be largely 
speculative. However, such alternative perspectives nevertheless need to be addressed and 
they deserve consideration in future research. 
 
Gade’s historical analysis 
Other recent work on Ubuntu includes that of Gade (2011), who performed a historical 
analysis of the use of Ubuntu in written sources from 1846 to 2011. His research identifies 
five periods in which the written sources indicate different uses of the term. In the first period 
(from 1846 to 1980) Ubuntu was described most frequently as a human quality, such as 
‘human nature’, ‘humanity’ or humanness’. In the second period, Ubuntu began being 
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associated with a philosophy or an ethic. This started from before the 1980s but became 
increasingly widespread in South Africa in the 1990s. In the third period, of which there is 
evidence from 1975, Ubuntu is described as an ‘African humanism’. In the fourth period, 
from the late 1990s, Ubuntu was described by some as a worldview, and in the last period 
Ubuntu is linked with the aphorism ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ – Gade finds evidence of 
this link first occurring between 1993 and 1995, but notes that most writing on Ubuntu from 
the 2000s includes this association. 
Based on his historical analysis Gade suggests that new uses of the term Ubuntu can be 
associated with times of social transformation in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In his view the 
use of the concept in recent decades can be interpreted as a ‘narrative of return’, in which 
appeal is made to “return to something African” (Gade, 2011, p. 304) following colonialism 
and apartheid: 
Broadly speaking, the postcolonial African narratives of return thus tend to divide 
history into three phases: first, the pre-colonial phase which, often but not always, is 
perceived as a ‘golden age’ characterized by harmony; second, a period of decline, 
which is understood to have been brought about by intruders who attempted to 
deprive the Africans of their resources, dignity, and culture; and third, a phase of 
recovery, where Africans, after having gained sufficient political power, attempt to 
restore their dignity and culture by returning to (what are claimed to be) traditional, 
humanist, or socialist values.(Gade, 2011, p. 304) 
Gade’s analysis, informed by historical research, to some extent supports the views of Van 
Binsbergen and Eze described above. As noted above, when considering the role that Ubuntu 
may play in business ethics in future, such perspectives need to be considered. 
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PROSPECTS FOR UBUNTU AND BUSINESS ETHICS 
The discussion thus far can be summarised as follows. Firstly, several problems can be 
identified in the existing literature on Ubuntu and business ethics: those claiming that sub-
Saharan Africans maintain the values of Ubuntu, values that are different to those maintained 
in the West, have not justified the claim with empirical evidence; ambiguities concerning the 
distinctive features of Ubuntu also undermine claims that Ubuntu can contribute significantly 
to global business ethics. Secondly, review of existing empirical studies reveals mixed results 
that, subject to several methodological limitations, preclude generalisations being made 
regarding the values of sub-Saharan Africans as a group. These suggest instead that a more 
complex or nuanced understanding of the values of sub-Saharan Africans is necessary. 
Thirdly, there are several alternative perspectives regarding Ubuntu that have been raised 
recently, or that have not been adequately considered, which raise further questions and that 
require greater attention when applying Ubuntu to business ethics.  
Taking these issues into account, this section considers several ways in which the research 
and application of Ubuntu in the area of business ethics can proceed. 
 
Research agenda 
Some of the issues discussed above suggest specific topics for research. The first area of 
research concerns empirical studies of value systems. The mixed results of the existing 
empirical studies suggest that there is substantial variation in the values of sub-Saharan 
Africans. Additional research, which focuses on specific areas or key distinctions, may shed 
light on this variation, and its underlying factors. Empirical studies of specific countries or 
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cultures, or comparisons between two specific countries or cultures, may allow for a more 
detailed appreciation of the value systems than is possible with larger multi-country surveys. 
Comparisons between African and non-African groups within specific contexts would also be 
informative and could identify values that are distinctive to certain sub-Saharan African 
societies (and which ultimately informs claims for a distinctive ethic that could contribute to 
business ethics globally).  
Quantitative studies of cultures and value systems are, however, limited, particularly with 
respect to how complex cultural and/or ethical concepts can be adequately expressed by 
scales on surveys. In contrast, qualitative research methods are particularly suited to 
providing in-depth descriptions of such concepts. The need for such research is particularly 
apparent when considering how, although there is a growing literature on Ubuntu, much of it 
is theoretical or philosophical in nature and there is a paucity of empirical studies specifically 
designed to study Ubuntu itself 9. Gade (2012) believes that there has been no ‘mapping’ of 
the different interpretations of Ubuntu to date at all, and that he provides the first such 
attempt. His analysis of various written sources and oral accounts identified two distinct 
interpretations of Ubuntu among various South Africans (of African descent). The first of 
these interpretations considers Ubuntu to represent a personal moral quality (such as empathy 
or the capacity to forgive), while the second sees Ubuntu as a “phenomenon according to 
which persons are interconnected” (Gade, 2012, p. 492). He also raises some moral concerns 
regarding the possible exclusivity of some interpretations. This is a useful example of 
qualitative analysis that provides the impetus for further empirical research in this area that 
could, for example, examine whether these distinctions are evident in particular workplaces, 
whether either of these predominates, and how such interpretations of Ubuntu may find 
application in organisational settings. 
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It is clear that a variety of research methods are necessary and appropriate, including 
qualitative methods that provide a deeper understanding of value systems and Ubuntu in 
particular, and that can complement the greater generalizability of well-designed quantitative 
studies. Specific research questions may be derived from anecdotes and personal experiences, 
while others may follow from the existing studies discussed above. Following Thomas and 
Bendixen’s (2000) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1997) research, we could ask 
why, if Ubuntu is considered to represent traditional (i.e. pre-colonial, black) African values 
that persist amongst contemporary black South Africans, there are no significant differences 
between white and black South Africans in the existing survey research? This could lead to 
the development of a specific research project to investigate the values of a sample of white 
and black South Africans in some detail. Further use of Hofstede’s instrument would need to 
specifically address the concerns raised by Thomas and Bendixen.  
Similar questions can be raised following the varied results of Noorderhaven and Tidjani’s 
(2001) study discussed above. For example, the high scores for the UK and USA respondents 
on the Human Goodness and Societal Responsibility scales, in comparison to most of the 
black sub-Saharan African respondents, runs counter to expectations based on the Ubuntu 
literature. Further examination of these concepts and the views of particular respondents 
would be informative, and would probably necessitate a more in-depth, qualitative approach.  
Other questions follow from the view that Ubuntu represents traditional, pre-industrial sub-
Saharan African values, as it could be expected that Ubuntu values may be more prevalent in 
the rural population. Africa remains the least urbanised continent, with 37 per cent of the sub-
Saharan population urban in 2011 (United Nations, 2012, p. 121), projected to increase to 46 
per cent by 2030 (United Nations, 2012, p. 127). In contrast, the figures for North America 
are 82 and 86 per cent respectively (United Nations, 2012, p. 11). Even South Africa, one of 
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the most industrialised African countries, is significantly less urbanised than Western 
countries, with 62 per cent urbanised in 2011 (United Nations, 2012, p. 121). If Ubuntu 
values are indeed prevalent in the rural sub-Saharan African population, then they certainly 
deserve consideration in the development of economic systems in sub-Saharan Africa. 
As the existing empirical studies discussed earlier were all conducted with urban samples, it 
could be hypothesised that high scores for individualism could reflect the values associated 
with urban, industrialised and/or wealthy lifestyles. This, however, raises another question: to 
what extent can different ‘positions’ on individualism – collectivism dimensions be explained 
by factors such as urbanisation, industrialisation, materialism and/or differences in wealth? 
Furthermore, if these different ‘positions’ can be explained by such factors, what role does 
culture have as a determining factor? And is the only ‘true’ sub-Saharan African culture 
necessarily rural? 
The rural – urban distinction raises further questions, as although Africa is the least urbanised 
continent, there are substantial rural populations around the world. Even in the urbanised 
West, the idea that people living in cities are more individualistic than those in rural areas is 
familiar. We can then ask (and develop empirical research projects to ascertain) whether rural 
populations in Western and other non-African countries share the values of Ubuntu with rural 
Africans. Rather than Ubuntu being a term for all sub-Saharan African societies, is it perhaps 
an African term that describes the value systems of all rural societies? 
The second area for research concerns the concept of Ubuntu itself, and its continued 
clarification. Ambiguities surrounding the concept frustrate efforts to apply it, and any 
arguments that call for its application. Reviewing the literature reveals that there are a 
number of different interpretations of Ubuntu, some of which appear to be inconsistent with 
each other, and it appears unlikely that a single conception of Ubuntu is even possible. For 
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the concept to be useful it would be appropriate, therefore, to distinguish between different 
interpretations of Ubuntu, and to develop research into specific interpretations. We could, for 
example, refer to Ramose’s Ubuntu, Shutte’s Ubuntu, or Metz’s Ubuntu, all of which are 
quite different, and which could be expected to have differing applications in business. 
Different interpretations could reflect different answers to the question raised earlier: If some 
traditional values or practices are excluded from Ubuntu, what are the criteria by which 
values and practices are deemed acceptable as Ubuntu values and practices? 
Following on from this, the relationship between Ubuntu and other ethical concepts and 
theories require more detailed exploration. Lutz (2009) does, for example, refer to the 
concept of the ‘Common Good’ but a more detailed comparison of how the Ubuntu 
‘Common Good’ relates to other understandings would be informative (such as Sison and 
Fontrodona’s recent (2012) explication of the Common Good with reference to Aristotelian 
ethics, Thomism and Catholic Social Thought; see also Argandoña (1998) and O’Brien 
(2009)). Similarly, there would appear to be considerable overlap between Ubuntu and virtue 
ethics, and a detailed consideration of this overlap, with implications for the business sphere 
would be relevant and appropriate. This could, for example, include a comparison with 
Solomon’s (1992) application of Aristotelian virtues to businesses as communities, Moore’s 
(2005) interpretation of MacIntyre’s virtue ethics as applied to business, and/or Audi’s (2012) 
account of the role of virtue ethics in businesses.   
 
Reconciliation and nation-building 
Although the claim that Ubuntu is a distinctive African ethic that can contribute to business 
ethics globally can be challenged, Ubuntu may have a significant contribution to make in 
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specific contexts. In South Africa in particular, with its still recent history of apartheid, 
persistent economic inequality, and ongoing challenges of reconciliation, transformation and 
nation-building, Ubuntu may be applicable and find resonance. As noted above, Eze sees 
Ubuntu as 
a reverse discourse to thwart and undermine the preceding racial hegemony of 
apartheid discourse … a project in the making of a new nation, which, unlike 
apartheid, yields to inclusiveness … [and] offers a blueprint for the very process of 
reconciliation and possibility of social morality. (Eze, 2010, p. 186) 
Shutte (2001, p. 3) states simply that “UBUNTU is almost the exact opposite of apartheid”. 
Given the divisiveness of apartheid and colonialism, an ethic of inclusiveness is clearly 
applicable and relevant. Shutte continues by suggesting that it is by virtue of South Africa’s 
particular circumstances, in which the rich live alongside the very poor, that Ubuntu can 
contribute globally (Nussbaum (2009a) makes a similar point). In this regard, former 
president Mbeki’s characterisation of South Africa as a country of two nations is valid, 
where: 
One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or 
geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, 
educational, communication and other infrastructure … The second and larger nation 
of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural 
areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled (Mbeki, 1998) 
 
To a large extent, this inequality remains. Research into black ownership of shares listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2011 reveals that 28 per cent of the available shares are 
held by black South Africans (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2011), yet black South 
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Africans make up approximately 80 per cent of the population (Statistics South Africa, 2011, 
p. 3). Shutte argues (2001, p. 4), however, that in this regard South Africa is a microcosm of 
the world, and that  
 
This is why we are such a powerful symbol for the rest of the world of the world-wide 
division between the developed and the undeveloped. But it is also this that puts us in 
a unique position to try to overcome it. Our position and our history both help to 
create ideal conditions for a unique experiment in reconciliation. The way we make 
use of this opportunity could be of huge significance for the rest of the world… But I 
am not thinking mainly of a political experiment but of an ethical one, an experiment 
in trying to live by values that have been hidden or forgotten. 
 
It is perhaps in this context of inequality and historical division that Ubuntu has global 
relevance. To the extent that Ubuntu succeeds in South Africa (and other countries in the 
aftermath of colonialism and conflict), it provides a model for other contexts that are 
characterised by inequality and division. Research into how Ubuntu (ideally a specific 
interpretation of Ubuntu) has contributed to overcoming inequality and division in specific 
cases would be significant, and would have immediate implications for other contexts around 
the world.    
Furthermore, if Ubuntu is conceived as an ethics of virtue, and if we associate Ubuntu with 
virtues such as tolerance, inclusiveness and harmony, then these contexts of inequality and 
division provide cases in which these virtues are applicable. Just as the virtue of courage is 
particularly applicable in war, and the virtue of wisdom is particularly applicable when 
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resolving disputes, so the virtues of Ubuntu may be considered particularly applicable when 
faced with inequality and division. 
 
Metz’s Ubuntu ethics of harmony 
A final interpretation deserves some consideration. Metz (2007) has provided a more 
analytical interpretation of Ubuntu than most Ubuntu scholars, presenting a “fundamental and 
general principle prescribing right actions” (2007, p. 322) that encapsulates what he believes 
are the essential characteristics of Ubuntu. His formulation stipulates that: 
An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is 
wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community.(2007, p. 334) 
Metz expands upon this, explaining that ‘harmony’ includes a combination of ‘shared 
identity’ and ‘goodwill’, and provides a revised theory of right action: 
An action is right just insofar as it promotes shared identity among people grounded 
on good-will; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to do so and tends to 
encourage the opposites of division and ill-will. (2007, p. 338) 
Although Metz’s analysis is subject to some of the same criticisms as some of the research on 
Ubuntu and business ethics described above (for example, he bases his analysis on certain 
values that he assumes are more common amongst Africans than Westerners), it is notable for 
providing an interpretation of Ubuntu that is considerably more specific than most, and that 
can be applied to specific issues in business ethics. Although Metz does not focus on such 
issues, he does note that 
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to compete with fellow citizens on labour and consumer markets with an eye to 
maximizing self-interest is of course not to act for the sake of others, and hence is not 
an instance of good-will. That is so, even if invisible hand effects turn out to be 
indirectly beneficial for society. (2007, p. 339) 
Metz (2009) has more recently applied this Ubuntu theory of right action to issues of 
nepotism and affirmative action in the public sector. He argues that in terms of this theory, 
nepotism would be considered wrong, but affirmative action (in the South African context) 
would be considered right. Regarding nepotism, Metz acknowledges that in a society in 
which shared identity and goodwill are the primary moral considerations, preferential hiring 
or procurement policies by public officials, in which they favour family and friends, may 
appear to be morally appropriate. He argues, however, that such partiality would produce 
significant division and ill-will amongst the general public, and that according to his Ubuntu 
theory of right action, it would thus be considered wrong. On the other hand, affirmative 
action is considered acceptable, as harmony would require reconciliation and the need to 
mend the divisiveness of apartheid, and affirmative action policies are one way of expressing 
such reconciliation. Metz acknowledges that those adversely affected by affirmative action 
policies may experience ill-will, but considers affirmative action to be acceptable as it would 
constitute the lesser injustice. 
There are a number of possible criticisms of Metz’s arguments on the issues of nepotism and 
affirmative action, an in-depth analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
the development of such a specific theory of Ubuntu, and its application to important ethical 
issues provides a good example of how Ubuntu can play a role in business ethics. In addition 
to the implications for public sector ethics, Metz indicates (as noted above) that according to 
this theory capitalism and market-based economic systems are immoral. His analysis on 
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nepotism and affirmative action also raises several further questions pertinent to the private 
sector: if nepotism by public officials is only considered wrong because of the ill-will created 
amongst the general public, would it not be acceptable (or even morally required) in the 
private sector, out of the public sphere? If the Ubuntu ethic is widely held, wouldn’t the 
general public understand and accept preferential hiring and procurement policies, and 
wouldn’t anyone excluded by such policies have their own particular opportunities through 
similar means? His theory of right action could also be applied to other issues in business 
ethics, raising other questions: To what extent is whistleblowing compatible or incompatible 
with an ethic of shared identity and goodwill? How can the need for independence and 
objectivity of external auditors be reconciled with an overriding concern for shared identity? 
Under what circumstances would retrenchments be morally permissible or impermissible? 
   
CONCLUSION 
Any philosophy that advocates harmonious relationships and acknowledges the inter-
relationships between individuals would seem to have obvious application in the business 
sphere. Previous research has introduced the African philosophy of Ubuntu to business ethics, 
this paper has contributed by providing a more critical analysis with the intention of 
facilitating further research and development in this area. This has been achieved firstly, 
through an analysis of the arguments that pervade much of the existing literature on Ubuntu 
and business ethics. Problems were identified regarding the empirical evidence provided to 
support general empirical claims. Furthermore, the distinctiveness of Ubuntu, and the extent 
to which it can contribute to business ethics globally, was brought into question through a 
consideration of the universality of Ubuntu, as well as a critique of how the values and 
theories underlying Western economic systems are presented.  
Ubuntu and business ethics 
33 
 
Secondly, alternative perspectives and interpretations of Ubuntu in the academic literature 
were considered. This included the findings from empirical cross-cultural studies that 
included sub-Saharan African countries. The mixed results of these studies suggest that 
generalisations regarding the values of sub-Saharan African societies do not have empirical 
support and that a more nuanced understanding is necessary. Questions were also raised 
regarding the nature of Ubuntu as a traditional African morality, and how certain traditional 
values are accommodated in contemporary societies in which gender inequality and 
ethnocentrism are deplored. Suggestions from other scholars of Ubuntu that the contemporary 
philosophy of Ubuntu is removed from traditional practice and is an invention of the African 
elite were also presented, along with more recent research into the historical written uses of 
Ubuntu, providing some insight into its development. 
Lastly, several prospects for Ubuntu with regard to research and application in business ethics 
were presented. Following the earlier analysis, several specific areas for further research, 
both empirical and non-empirical, were identified. The possible role that Ubuntu could play 
within a context of inequality and division (such as that in post-apartheid South Africa), in 
terms of reconciliation and nation-building, was also highlighted. Finally, Metz’s theory of 
Ubuntu was discussed as an example of how a specific interpretation of Ubuntu can be 
developed and applied to issues of business ethics. 
The intention of this paper is to provide a more critical analysis of Ubuntu and how it can be 
applied in the area of business ethics. Following Eze’s view that “exposing ubuntu to 
criticisms is another way of validating its actual significance and value” (2010, p. 186), it is 
hoped that this will stimulate future research in the area. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The purpose of this section is to introduce readers to contemporary understanding of Ubuntu 
(reflecting the substantial increase in publications on Ubuntu since the 1990s), rather than to 
research on traditional African culture. In order to achieve this aim the focus is on recent 
sources, particularly those that provide a comprehensive account of Ubuntu and those that 
consider ethical aspects of Ubuntu. 
 
2  Although Mbiti (1989) refers to this aphorism, he does not relate it to Ubuntu. There is no 
reference for Ubuntu in the index to the second edition of African religions and philosophy. 
 
3  Ramose also insists that Ubuntu is not only a moral concept, but is “the root of African 
philosophy” (1999, p. 49) and “the fundamental ontological and epistemological category in 
the African thought of the Bantu-speaking people” (1999, p. 50). He considers the word to be 
a gerundive, a verbal noun denoting a particular state of being and becoming at the 
same time. It thus denotes a particular action already performed, an enduring action 
or state of be-ing and the openness to yet another action or state of be-ing (2003b, p. 
643) 
 
4  The full list of ‘core’ and ‘associated’ Ubuntu values identified by Broodryk is as follows 
(2002, p. 32):  
Humanness: Warmth, tolerance, understanding, peace, humanity 
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Caring: Empathy, sympathy, helpfulness, charitable, friendliness 
Sharing: Giving (unconditionally), redistribution, openhandedness 
Respect: Commitment, dignity, obedience, order, normative 
Compassion: Love, cohesion, informality, forgiving, spontaneity 
 
5 Lutz (2009, p. 315) does acknowledge the work of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(1997) when pointing out the differences between some ethnic groups. However, he did not 
comment on their findings that suggest relatively high scores for individualism amongst some 
black South African groups, a lack of significant differences between some black and white 
South Africans, and that some black groups reflected greater individualism than white 
Afrikaners.  
 
6 As noted earlier, some scholars consider Ubuntu values to be universal. Western examples 
that are comparable to African examples then provide support for a universal Ubuntu. While 
this may be true, consistently maintaining such a view of Ubuntu together with the claim that 
sub-Saharan African societies maintain a value system that is different to that maintained in 
the West then appears problematic. 
 
7 See also Maitland (1989, 1997, 1998) for moral arguments in favour of the market 
mechanisms that underlie the shareholder-oriented approach. 
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8  Lobola is a traditional Southern African marital custom in which a prospective husband 
makes a payment to his fiancée’s family. 
 
9  Two examples of empirical, qualitative studies that do not study Ubuntu in great detail, but 
that do include some questions or analysis regarding Ubuntu are West (2010) and Louw and 
Fourie (2011).
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